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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5604
This paper explores the reduction of food insecurity in 
Bolivia, adopting a supply side approach that analyzes 
the role of agricultural spending on vulnerability. 
Vulnerability to food insecurity is captured by 
a municipal level composite––developed locally 
within the framework of World Food Program food 
security analysis––that combines welfare outcomes, 
weather conditions and agricultural potential for all 
327 municipalities in 2003, 2006 and 2007. Our 
econometric results indicate that levels of public 
agricultural spending are positively associated with high 
or very high vulnerability. The authors interpret this to 
indicate that agricultural spending allocation decisions 
This paper is a product of the Poverty Reduction and Equity Unit, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network; 
and the Agriculture and Rural Development Unit of the Sustainable Development Department in the Latin America 
and Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a 
contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the 
Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at jcuesta@worldbank.org and sedmeades@worldbank.org.
are driven by high or very high vulnerability levels. 
In other words, more agricultural spending appears 
to be destined to where it is more needed in line with 
previous findings in other sectors in Bolivia. This is 
confirmed through a number of specifications, including 
contemporaneous and lagged relationships between 
spending and vulnerability. They also find evidence 
of public spending on infrastructure and research and 
extension services having a significant (but very small) 
effect towards reducing high vulnerability. This indicates 
the importance of the composition of public agricultural 
spending in shaping its relationship with vulnerability to 
food insecurity. Food Insecurity and Public Agricultural Spending in Bolivia: 
Putting Money Where Your Mouth Is? 
 
Jose Cuesta, Svetlana Edmeades and Lucia Madrigal
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1.  Introduction 
The recent food price crisis has contributed to a shift in many developing countries, including 
Bolivia, toward food security as a key policy objective. Even prior to the international food price 
crisis  of  2008,  Bolivia  had  brought  food  security  and  sovereignty  to  the  center  stage  of  its 
development agenda, defined in the National Development Plan 2006-2010. The food price crisis 
and recurrent climate change phenomena are adversely affecting the country and have created a 
sense  of  urgency  in  better  understanding  and  addressing  food  security.  Food  security  and 
sovereignty feature prominently in the Government Plan 2010-2015 and are key elements of 
several government programs currently under implementation.  
 
Food security is a complex phenomenon involving multiple factors. In Bolivia, declining food 
security could be the result of a number of trends:
2 (i) reduced cultivated land area and increased 
land fragmentation; (ii) strengthening export-oriented agriculture by large-scale producers; (iii) 
increased food imports and dependence on international markets; (iv) growing urbanization and 
movement of labor away from  rural areas; (v) dietary changes from traditional foodstuffs like 
potato to manufactured agricultural products; and (vi) environmental shocks such as droughts 
and floods. These trends are accentuated by structural factors, such as the rigid geography of the 
country and limited road coverage, which inhibit domestic market integration.  
 
Considering the  multiple factors affecting  an  individual‘s  ability  to  easily  access  food  that 
adequately  satisfies  their  needs—the  widely  accepted  definition  of  food  security
3—a  single, 
―silver bullet‖ policy for addressing food insecurity is likely to have a limited impact. As a result, 
food security interventions in Bolivia, as in other countries, span several sectors. A rigorous 
attempt to assess the impact of the many different interventions would be a major undertaking 
requiring  a  great  deal  of  data  and  analytical  sophistication  to  encompass  all  programs  and 
address  counterfactual  and  endogeneity  issues.  This  paper  takes  a  supply-side  approach  by 
looking  at  the  association  of  agricultural  spending  (broadly  defined)  and  food  security. 
Agricultural spending in Bolivia—totaling about 13 percent of GDP in 2008—captures a large 
portion of the public money being destined to food security, and as such is a good indicator of 
public  interventions  that  aim  at  reducing  vulnerability.  However,  it  provides  only  a  partial 
perspective on addressing food security, as spending in other sectors (health, education) is also 
important for reducing vulnerabilities. In any case, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to make inferences about the relationship between sectoral spending in agriculture and 
food security in Bolivia.
4 By showing linkages between public expenditure and a measure of 
                                                           
2 See Ormaechea, 2009, Cuesta et al. 2009, and World Bank, 2010a for more on the causes of food insecurity in 
Bolivia. 
3 The definition of food security and sovereignty adopted in Bolivia is based on FAO 2006, which incorporates not 
just food availability but also stable access and the use of food as part of an adequate diet and the stability of access. 
Consistent with those guidelines, Bolivia‘s definition (UPB 2008, 26) covers risk exposure, capacity to address food 
insecurity and current situation as part of a historical trend.  
4 Previous studies, such as Faguet (2004) or Inchauste (2009), have focused on the link between public spending and 
welfare in the contexts of decentralization and the Heavily Indebted Poor Country debt-relief initiatives, 
respectively. Faguet (2004) singles out the association between agricultural investments and municipal needs 
(proxied by municipal malnutrition rates) concluding that the 1994 decentralization reform implied a relatively 
modest increase in agricultural investments but an improvement in the needs-based allocation of those investments 
(as it was the case in several social sectors).  
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vulnerability (Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping, or  VAM), both  defined at  the municipal 
level, this paper is a first step to guiding policy recommendations on food security in the country. 
 
The analysis generates several key findings: (i) public agricultural spending is associated with 
high levels of vulnerability, which may imply that resource allocation decisions in agriculture 
take  into  account  food  insecurity;  (ii)  incremental  public  spending  in  agriculture  has  a 
(statistically  significant)  impact  towards  reducing  vulnerability,  but  in  the  short  run  this 
association is negligible in magnitude; (iii) the composition of public expenditure matters, as the 
effects of resource allocations in agriculture are not uniform across its categories; and (iv) there 
are important department specific effects across Bolivia.  
 
 
2.  Agriculture and Food Security in Bolivia 
Agriculture  plays  an  important  role  in  the  economy  of  Bolivia  and  it  is  one  of  the  key 
components  of  the  government‘s  poverty  reduction  strategy,  particularly  in  rural  areas.  The 
sector accounts for 13 percent of GDP or 27 percent if agribusiness is considered. Despite the 
decline in rural population (currently 33 percent of the total population), the sector employs 
almost 90 percent of the economically active people living in rural areas (World Bank, 2010b). 
The vast majority of the rural population employed in agriculture is poor: 85 percent live in 
poverty and 75 percent in extreme poverty (UDAPE, 2006). 
 
Agriculture is a very spatially heterogeneous sector and its importance varies across regions. 
This reflects both the agro-ecological diversity of Bolivia as well as differences in the orientation 
of production. The traditional agricultural sector, with small units of production, is concentrated 
in the western highlands and valleys, and focuses on food production primarily destined  for 
domestic markets. The sector‘s contribution to departmental economies in this region ranges 
between 4 percent and 9 percent of GDP, with a high level of non-agricultural income. On the 
other hand, the eastern lowlands are characterized by more intensive agricultural production and 
agribusiness, with a mixture of large and small producers, focusing primarily on export markets. 
In the lowlands, the contribution of agriculture (excluding agribusiness) to departmental GDP 
ranges  between  16  percent  and  32  percent,  and  the  weight  of  agricultural  income  in  total 
household income is very large (World Bank, 2010c). 
 
Despite the sector‘s potential, agricultural productivity in Bolivia is among the lowest in Latin 
America.  Agricultural  output  growth  has  exhibited  higher  volatility  due  to  adverse  climatic 
pressures and lack of adequate mechanisms to respond to risk. Recurrent climate disasters related 
to the El Niño and La Niña phenomena affect the volume of agricultural production. Climate 
disasters explain around 5 percentage points of the 17 percent food price inflation rate observed 
in  2003,  due to  their effects  on  agricultural  output (World  Bank, 2010a). Risk  management 
interventions  have  been  recent  and  led  by  the  state.  A  state-owned  enterprise,  the  Food 
Production Assistance Company (Empresa de Apoyo a la Producción de Alimentos—EMAPA), 
was created in 2007 to support food production by small and medium size producers through 
financing,  intermediation  of  inputs  and  final  products  and  access  to  machinery.  A  universal 
agricultural insurance policy, proposed by the Government Plan 2010-2015, is currently being 




The agricultural sector strategy (Plan for a Rural, Agrarian and Forestry Revolution) identifies 
three main objectives: (i) attain food security and sovereignty; (ii) enhance the condition of rural 
populations  by  increasing  agricultural  and  forest  production;  and  (iii)  assure  the  sustainable 
management of natural resources. The first objective spans several sectors, which makes sector-
specific  impact  assessments  challenging.  The  second  objective  is  a  core  agricultural  sector 
objective and in Bolivia, as in other countries, public investment in the core public goods such as 
research and extension, and to a limited extent in irrigation, has been able to increase agricultural 
growth (Bolivia APER, 2011).  
 
Interventions  to  address  food  insecurity  in  Bolivia  are  being  undertaken  within  a  broader 
political  context  and  span  different  sectors  (see  Annex  1  for  a  complete  list):  (i)  land 
redistribution; (ii) promotion of food production and exports by state-owned enterprises such as 
EMAPA,  among  others;  (iii)  food  security  programs,  including  support  to  communities  and 
small producers based on traditional and indigenous technologies; and (iv) nutritional programs 
for  children,  pregnant  women  and  mothers  with  lactating  infants,  and  school  meals,  among 
others. 
 
The current focus of the Rural Plan is on strengthening family agriculture and small agricultural 
units, including indigenous and other rural communities, with emphasis on productivity and food 
security. This is done through a myriad of programs implemented at the national, departmental 
and municipal levels under mandates of several ministries. Four of the ten programs currently 
implemented by the Ministry of Rural Development and Lands (Ministerio de Desarrollo Rural 
y Tierras—MDRyT) have food security provisions: (i) food security at the municipal level; (ii) 
creating rural food initiatives; (iii) organizing self-governing rural development; and (iv) state 
support for rural food enterprises. The Program for Support to Food Security  (Programa de 
Apoyo a la Seguridad Alimentaria—PASA) became a de-concentrated entity of the MDRyT, and 
has a national mandate for food security. Although these programs represent a large portion of 
the public resources spent on food security, they do not capture the whole range of initiatives. 
They  represent  mostly  the  food  production  and  distribution  aspects  of  food  security,  with 
nutritional programs mostly covered under the mandates of other ministries. 
 
To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  there  are  no  rigorous  evaluations  or  assessments  on  the 
effectiveness  of  these  programs.  Previously,  Faguet  (2004)  concluded  that  the  1994 
decentralization  reform  increased investments  in  agriculture as  well as  several  social  sectors 
(education, water and sanitation – but not healthcare) and urban development. Furthermore, the 
observed increase in investments was unambiguously needs-based, with municipal malnutrition 
rates found a statistically significant factor driving the allocation of agricultural spending in the 
decentralized context. Unfortunately, the study has two important limitations: it does not provide 
any evidence on the effects of agricultural investments on malnutrition rates; and data refers to 
the  period  1987-1996.  Inchauste  (2009),  looking  at  the  effects  of  poor-poor  spending  (as 
categorized  by  the  HIPC  initiative)  between  2000  and  2005,  rejects  a  strong  link  between 
spending on education, healthcare and infrastructure and improvements in municipal welfare 
indicators. Unfortunately, the study does not consider any nutritional or food security related 






3.  Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) 
VAM is a tool to identify the degree of food insecurity and vulnerability at the municipal level in 
Bolivia. It assigns a value from 1 to 5 to each municipality according to level of food insecurity 
and vulnerability, where 1= very low, 2 = low, 3 = medium, 4 = high, 5 = very high.
5 Developed 
by the Universidad Privada de Bolivia and  Social and Economic Policy Analysis Unit (Unidad 
de  Analisis  de  Políticas  Sociales  y  Ecónomicas—UDAPE)  in  the  Ministry  of  Development 
Planning,
  the VAM uses a World Food Program methodology (WFP, 2010)
6 and it is widely 
accepted in Bolivia as a formal measurement of food insecurity. VAM measures are available for 
2003, 2006 and 2007 for  all  327 municipalities across the  nine  departments  that constitute 
Bolivia.  
 
The VAM is constructed with community-level data using principal component analysis. Among 
the components used for all three iterations are: urbanization rate, rural population density and its 
square,  proportion  of  institutionally  attended  births ,  schooling  years,  log  of  per  capita 
consumption, under-five malnutrition rate, altitude, rainfall and a flood propensity categorical 
variable (four values). Components used only in the 2003 VAM and not used in subsequent 
updates include: dependency rate, life expectancy, agricultural potential (a categorical four-point 
scale variable capturing soil capacity), forestry potential, road density, draught frequency, frost 
days per year, low weight at birth and per capita household food expenditures.   
 
Although changes  in VAM scores between 2003 and 2007 were   not uniform, the average 
vulnerability  status  by  department  decrease d  over  time,  suggesting  that,  on  average, 
municipalities within each department have reduced their vulnerability to food insecurity (Figure 
1). The  exception is Cochabamba, the only department where average vulnerability to food 
insecurity increased over time. Tarija and the three llanos departments of Santa Cruz, Beni and 
Pando registered, on average, between moderate and low vulnerability in 2007.
7  
 
   
                                                           
5 Specifically, the methodology estimates each municipality‘s probability of pertaining to each one of these 
vulnerable categories, that is, five probabilities per municipality, and the largest of which determining the final 
vulnerability status the municipality is assigned to. Thus, if the estimated probability – conditioned to a number of 
controls– of a given municipality to pertain to VAM=5 is 85%, that municipality is said to have a very high 
vulnerability status to food insecurity. These probabilities are used below for the correlation analysis – see Figure 5.  
6 WFP (2010) identifies five categories of food security situations. Phase 1 refers to generally food secure; Phase 2 - 
moderately/borderline food insecure; Phase 3 - acute food and livelihood crisis; Phase 4 - humanitarian emergency 
and Phase 5 - famine/humanitarian catastrophe. See http://fsa.wfp.org/special_documents/FSA_Factsheet_EN.pdf 
7  Similar results are obtained comparing VAM 2003 and VAM 2006.   
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Figure 1. Vulnerability Status by Department        
 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) Agricultural Public Expenditure Database (APER). 
 
At the municipal level, 62 percent of the municipalities were categorized in 2007 as having a 
moderate to very low vulnerability to food insecurity (VAM 1 to 3), while 38 percent were in the 
high to very high vulnerability (4 and 5) categories. The percentage of municipalities with high 
or very high levels of vulnerability to food insecurity decreased from 51 percent in 2003 to 38 
percent in 2007 (Figure 2).  
 
 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database. 
 
However,  this  reduction  masks  important  variations  in  the  vulnerability  situation  across 
municipalities.  Evidence  suggests  that  mobility  across  vulnerability  levels  is  limited  and 
asymmetric.  Transition  matrices  (Table  1)  indicate  that  80  percent  of  municipalities  did  not 
change either their low/moderate or high/very high vulnerability status between 2003 and 2007. 
For each municipality that worsened its status from low to high vulnerability, more than two 
improved from high to low vulnerability. This is also true comparing 2003 to 2006.  
 
Table 1. Vulnerability Transition Matrix by Municipality 
    2006  2007 
    Low vulnerability  High vulnerability  Low vulnerability  High vulnerability 
2003  Low vulnerability  146 (45%)  14 (4%)  148 (45%)  12 (4%) 
High vulnerability  35 (11%)  132 (40%)  54 (17%)  113 (35%) 




























Figure 2. Percentage of Municipalities by Vulnerability Status





4.  Public Agricultural Expenditure in Bolivia 
Public  spending  in  agriculture  (including  rural  development)  has  historically  been  low  in 
Bolivia—13 percent of GDP in 2008. It has predominantly focused on resources for productive 
infrastructure  (e.g.  roads,  irrigation,  and  rural  electrification)  and  less  so  on  agricultural 
innovation. In the last five years public agricultural spending both in nominal and real terms has 
increased markedly (Figure 3a), as has rural development spending in general. The participation 
of sub-national governments in the allocation of public resources has also been more prominent 
in recent years (Figure 3a), both in terms of extended (agriculture and rural development) and 
restricted (just agriculture) spending (Figure 3b). Investment spending has dominated current 
spending for both extended and restricted agricultural spending, although relative weights are 
subject to sizeable yearly variations (Figures 3c and 3d).  
 
Figure 3. Agricultural Spending in Bolivia (constant 2005 prices) 
(a)  Distribution  of  Agricultural  Spending      (b)  Distribution  of  Municipal  Agricultural       
by Administrative Level (Mill. Bo.)                 Spending by Type (Mill. Bo.)   
   
 
















































(c) Distribution of Extended Agricultural        (d) Distribution of Restricted Agricultural 
Spending (%)           Spending (%) 
   
Note: In Figure 3b, 3c and 3d, ―restricted‖ spending refers to narrowly defined agricultural spending (including 
spending in core public goods, such as research, extension, irrigation), and ―extended‖ refers to rural development 
spending broadly defined (including expenditures in productive infrastructure, such as roads, rural electrification, 
etc.). The detailed definition is provided in Annex 2. ―Prefectura‖ refers to the departmental government, currently 
called ‗Gobernaciones‘. 
Source: World Bank APER (2010). 
 
 
Figure 4. Per Capita Agricultural Spending by Department (constant 2005 prices) 
 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database. 
 
 
The increasing trend of per capita agricultural public spending, however, is not uniform across 
departments (Figure 4). This is partly due to transfer mechanisms currently in Bolivia. Central 
government transfers constitute almost the sole source of income for departmental governments 





















































































































more restrictive at the departmental level. Defined by a number of decrees, departmental transfer 
amounts are based on population formulas, and implicit prioritization of social and productive 
infrastructure  is  used  for  allocating  transfer  resources.  The  discretionary  use  of  transfers  is 
broader at the municipal level. See Inchauste (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the transfer 
allocation formula.   
 
The public expenditure data used in this paper was derived from the Accounting Department of 
the Ministry of the Economy and Public  Finance of  Bolivia. Expenditure data in  Bolivia is 
typically recorded by program and project, and aggregated at the national level. The expenditure 
data on agriculture and rural development was disaggregated by function (research, extension, 
irrigation,  rural  roads,  etc.),  economic  classification  (current  and  capital)  and  level  of 
government (national, departmental and municipal) for a period of 13 years (1996-2008). This 
provides  a  rich  panel  for  analysis  within  and  across  levels  of  government  or  categories  of 
spending. Annex 2 presents the definitions of categories used in this analysis.  
 
5.  Analyzing the Effects of Agricultural Spending on VAM 
 
A simple correlation of the municipal distributions of agricultural spending and probabilities of 
each  category  of  vulnerability  to  food  insecurity  indicates  that  total  per  capita  agricultural 
spending and vulnerability to food insecurity are only weakly correlated at the municipal level. 
The correlation between per capita agricultural spending (in Bolivianos) and VAM is only 0.03 
in 2007. The relationship between VAM scores across the 327 Bolivian municipalities and per 
capita total agricultural spending in 2007 in these municipalities is almost horizontal (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Per Capita Agricultural Expenditure and Probability of Being in Each VAM 
Category 
 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
Note: each figure depicts the association between the estimated probability of vulnerability across municipalities 
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The weak correlation between the two variables also holds when the five categories of food 
insecurity are grouped as either (i) moderate or better, or (ii) high or very high vulnerability to 
food  insecurity  (Figure  6).  When  total  agricultural  spending  (not  in  per  capita  terms)  and 
vulnerability categories are compared, results remain very similar, thus confirming that scale 
considerations do not appear to drive these patterns (Figure 7).  
 
Figure 6.  Per Capita Agricultural Expenditure and Probability of Being in Each VAM 
Category Grouping 
 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database. 
Note: each figure depicts the association between the estimated probability of vulnerability across municipalities 
pertaining to the respective vulnerability group, that is, low (categories 1 to 3) and high (categories 4 and 5) 
 
Figure 7. Total Agricultural Expenditure and Probability of Being in Each VAM Category 
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Note: each figure depicts the association between the estimated probability of vulnerability across municipalities 
pertaining to the respective vulnerability group, that is, low (categories 1 to 3) and high (categories 4 and 5) 
 
 
There  are  several  possible  explanations  for  the  weak  association  between  agricultural 
expenditure and vulnerability to food insecurity. One is that agricultural spending alone has a 
weak direct impact on the reduction of vulnerability to food insecurity in Bolivia. A second 
possibility is that composition effects within agricultural spending may not be captured through 
an aggregate measure of sectoral spending. The correlations between categories of agricultural 
per  capita  spending  and  VAM  are  -0.18  for  restricted  and  0.43  for  extended  agricultural 
spending, respectively (see Annex 2 for definitions of each category). This suggests that the 
composition of spending may be important for reducing vulnerability to food insecurity, and that 
the two categories of spending may be working in different directions, offsetting their individual 
effects (which would explain the weak correlation for total spending). A third explanation may 
be that higher agricultural spending is poverty-driven (i.e. it is a proxy for lower development 
levels) rather than a variable able to pick up impacts on vulnerability to food insecurity. Per 
capita  agricultural  spending  correlates  positively  with  malnutrition  rates  (Figure  8a)  and 




Figure 8. Per Capita Agricultural Expenditure and Welfare Measures 
 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
Note: Per capita expenditure in Bolivianos. 
 
 
In addition to these simple correlations, the proposed econometric estimation strategy consists of 
predicting the probability  of pertaining to  categories  4 and 5 of  VAM in  a given  year (V), 
determined by per capita agricultural spending, our key policy variable of analysis (A). Note that 
this analysis aims at understanding whether and how agricultural spending affects high and very 
high food insecurity risks.  It  does  not  answer the question of whether  and how agricultural 
                                                           
8 Other explanation mentioned in the context of public spending and welfare levels in Bolivia, see Inchauste (2009), 
refers to the misalignment between central and local government decisions. Although our paper does not test 
explicitly this hypothesis, the enormous quantity of agricultural programs, not always clearly delimited in terms of 
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spending affects the overall risk to food insecurity.
9 Implicit in this decision is the assumption 
that the ultimate policy objective related to food insecurity in Bolivia is to reduc e high levels of 
vulnerability to food insecurity, rather than improving the  overall vulnerability profile of the 
population  (as  that  may  not  be  enough  to  take  the  population  away  from  a  situation  of  a 
considerable insecurity risk).  
 
The  analysis  of  the  effects  of  agricultural  spending  on  high  and  very  high  vulnerability  is 
conducted at a municipal level (for each municipality j). The covariates of interest in this study 
relate  to  agricultural  spending  by  municipality,  Aj,  which  is  decomposed  into  multiple 
categorizations ―i‖ of spending: restricted and extended; current and capital; and research and 
development, infrastructure, support, administrative and other. Equation 1 shows the estimated 
model, which follows a probit specification: 
 
) ( ) 1 (    
i
ji i j A F V P       (1) 
 
Where Vj=1 if municipality j is categorized as VAM type 4 or 5; 0 otherwise; and F ( ) is the 
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.  
 
The analysis clusters errors by municipality, which allows controlling for variation within each 
municipality caused by unobserved variables. Additional variations within departments that are 
not  municipality-specific  are  controlled  by  department  dummies  D  (depicted  in  probit 
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ji i j D A F V P   
      (2)
 
 
Three alternative estimates of equation (2) are attempted based on the assumed inter-temporal 
relations of vulnerability and spending: (i) contemporaneous estimation; (ii) lagged estimation; 
and (iii) difference estimation. 
 
Contemporaneous estimation 











            (2‘) 
 
                                                           
9  Hence,  the  analysis  indicates  whether  spending  more  on  agriculture  may  actually  contribute  to  moving 
municipalities from very high or high vulnerable to moderate or low vulnerability, rather than whether spending may 
move a municipality up or down the distribution. For the latter question, a dependent variable would capture the 
level of vulnerability from 1 to 5, rather than whether or not the municipality belongs to categories 4 and 5. An 
analysis of the effects across all levels of vulnerability—that is, categories 1 to 5—is presented in Annex 3. Results 
are consistent with the results found in the simple correlations: there is not much association between per capita 
expenditure (extended and restricted) and the category of VAM associated to the municipality. As Tables 6 and 7 
will show below this may well have to do with an asymmetric association of spending and vulnerability (that is, 
different associations across levels of vulnerability).  
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Results for 2003 are reported in Table 2. Per capita agricultural spending of a municipality is 
positively  associated  with  an  increased  probability  of  belonging  to  high  or  very  high 
vulnerability to food insecurity. This association is statistically significant (Column 1). Both 
restrictive  and  extended  categories  of  agricultural  spending  have  a  significant  positive 
association with high or very high vulnerability, the former exceeding the latter (Column 2). 
There appear to be strong compositional effects by category of spending: investment spending 
has a positive and statistically significant association on higher vulnerability to food insecurity 
(Column 3), as does infrastructure spending (Column 4). The results also suggest department-
specific effects: Cochabamba, Tarija, Santa Cruz, and Beni have a significantly lower probability 
of pertaining to high or very high vulnerable status compared to La Paz, once controlling for 
agricultural  spending,  a  result  that  holds  across  specifications.  Tarija,  Santa  Cruz,  Beni  and 
Pando have the lowest average VAM. 
 
 
Table 2. Effects of Per Capita Agricultural Spending on Vulnerability to Food Insecurity 
2003 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 







         
Total expenditure  2.0289***          
  (0.593)       
Restricted expenditure     3.4405***       
    (1.234)     
Extended expenditure     1.6372**       
    (0.677)     
Current expenditures        0.5661    
      (0.625)   
Investment expenditures        2.5370***    
      (0.931)   
Research and extension           -8.1926 
        (5.661) 
Infrastructure           2.6589*** 
        (1.019) 
Support and development           4.1284* 
        (2.495) 
Administration and procedures           -1.4135 
        (1.564) 
Chuquisaca  0.1351  0.1205  0.1261  0.1184 
  (0.134)  (0.134)  (0.137)  (0.139) 
Cochabamba  -0.2879***  -0.2969***  -0.2909***  -0.2888*** 
  (0.084)  (0.084)  (0.085)  (0.086) 
Oruro  -0.1407  -0.1564  -0.1305  -0.1399  
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  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.100) 
Potosí  0.1613  0.1492  0.1664*  0.1579 
  (0.101)  (0.102)  (0.100)  (0.100) 
Tarija  -0.3484***  -0.3765***  -0.3326***  -0.3804*** 
  (0.108)  (0.103)  (0.109)  (0.105) 
Santa Cruz  -0.5676***  -0.5782***  -0.5675***  -0.5646*** 
  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.052)  (0.053) 
Beni  -0.4402***  -0.4429***  -0.4258***  -0.4233*** 
  (0.081)  (0.081)  (0.084)  (0.087) 
Pando  0.0900  0.0722  0.1363  0.1112 
  (0.166)  (0.173)  (0.161)  (0.163) 
              
Observations  327  327  327  327 
R2  0.279  0.282  0.284  0.293 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
 
In general, the direction and compositional structure of the association in 2007 is the same as in 
2003, but the magnitude is much lower (Table 3). The link between spending in agriculture and 
vulnerability is found to be statistically significant and positively, but with a markedly lower 
magnitude than in 2003 (Column 1). The estimated association is being driven predominantly by 
restricted spending, as it was in 2003 (Column 2). As in 2003, investment spending appears to 
have a positive relationship with vulnerability to food insecurity (Column 3), suggesting that 
more investment goes where higher vulnerability exists; however, the magnitude of the effect is 
much lower in 2007. A similar pattern emerges for infrastructure spending in 2007, but now 
research and extension spending is positively associated with food insecurity (Column 4). As in 
2003, Tarija, Santa Cruz, Beni and Pando are less likely to belong to high/very high vulnerable 
categories than La Paz, but in 2007 Chuquisaca and Potosí are more likely than La Paz to pertain 
to  high  vulnerability  categories  (Columns  1  through  4).  Chuquisaca  and  Potosí  are  the  two 
departments with the highest vulnerability to food insecurity.  
 
 
Table 3. Effects of Per Capita Agricultural Spending on Vulnerability to Food Insecurity 
2007 
      (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Total exp  Restricted  and 
extended 
definitions 




         
Total expenditure  0.5843***          
  (0.220)       
Restricted expenditure     1.2889***       
    (0.489)     
Extended expenditure     0.3106        
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    (0.286)     
Current expenditures        0.6495    
      (0.577)   
Investment expenditures        0.5714**    
      (0.281)   
Research and extension           8.9864** 
        (4.128) 
Infrastructure           0.6776* 
        (0.352) 
Support and development           0.0562 
        (0.991) 
Administration  and 
procedures 
         0.2547 
        (0.860) 
Chuquisaca  0.3885***  0.3702***  0.3995***  0.3799*** 
  (0.108)  (0.112)  (0.107)  (0.110) 
Cochabamba  0.0951  0.0825  0.1042  0.0782 
  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.092)  (0.092) 
Oruro  0.1316  0.1024  0.1437  0.1226 
  (0.100)  (0.100)  (0.099)  (0.100) 
Potosí  0.3162***  0.3089***  0.3178***  0.3080*** 
  (0.096)  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.097) 
Tarija  -0.3516***  -0.3640***  -0.3485***  -0.3470*** 
  (0.036)  (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.035) 
Santa Cruz  -0.2899***  -0.2934***  -0.2830***  -0.2975*** 
  (0.060)  (0.058)  (0.061)  (0.057) 
Beni  -0.3164***  -0.3148***  -0.3124***  -0.3339*** 
  (0.059)  (0.057)  (0.062)  (0.053) 
Pando  -0.3711***  -0.3674***  -0.3750***  -0.3742*** 
  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
              
Observations  327  327  327  327 
R2  0.217  0.223  0.217  0.226 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
 
 
The results from both estimations do not provide a clear direction in the relationship between 
public spending in agriculture and vulnerability. It is possible—in fact, desirable—that public 
spending  allocations  are  guided  by  levels  of  past  vulnerability.  Hence,  endogeneity  may  be 
biasing  the  results.
10  Some categories of  public spending,  such as  infrastructure,  could be 
                                                           
10 We investigate this relationship by regressing the impact of 2003 VAM levels on agricultural spending in 2007, at 
the municipal level. Annex 3 reports the results, which confirm that an endogenous relationship may well underlie  
16 
 
determined by levels of (or changes in) vulnerability. That is, reducing vulnerability would be 
one of the drivers of rural infrastructure spending decisions. On the other hand, vulnerability may 
or may not guide research and extension investments. Profitability, for example, may play a 
more prominent  role  in  the allocation of such investments. Cumulative aspects  may  also  be 
affecting  such  decisions.  For  example,  only  where  previous  investments  in  research  and 
extension  exist  should  further  investments  be  expected—unless  a  critical  threshold  can  be 
achieved,  no  investments  will  be  initiated.  In  order  to  explore  these  issues,  we  proceed  in 
sequential steps exploring two other estimation approaches. 
 
Lagged estimation 
We estimate the probability of pertaining to high or very high vulnerability categories in 2007 
against spending in two past time periods: (i) levels of 2006 agricultural spending (Table 4); and 
(ii) levels of 2003 agricultural spending (Table 5), allowing for potentially longer-term inter-
temporal effects. This is captured in specification (2‘‘).   
 
) ( )] 1 [( 1 1     
i
jit jt jt t j A F V P      (2‘‘) 
 
We find that  2006 agricultural  spending effect on 2007 VAM is  statistically significant  and 
positive,  as  it  was  the  case  for  the  contemporaneous  2007  results,  although  the  size  of  the 
association is larger (Table 4, Column 1). Results also confirm a larger association of restricted 
vis-à-vis extended spending, similar to 2007. Although investment spending continues to have a 
positive and significant effect on VAM, the association of current spending appears to also be 
important and much larger. It is, however, unclear how current spending—mostly wages and 
salaries—may be related to vulnerability. Increasing current spending may be associated with a 
larger presence of civil servants as investment spending increases in most needed areas (pointing 
to  a  complementary  rather  substitutive  nature  between  both  types  of  spending).  Other 
explanation might imply accepting a negative income effect on vulnerability associated with 
salaries  of  civil  servants.
11  The one-year lag  does not  reveal important differences in the 
magnitude of the effects of the different functional classifications of agricultural spending vis-à-
vis  contemporaneous  specifications .  Infrastructure  maintains  its  statistical  significance  and 
association with increased vulnerability, and there is a positive impact from spending in research 
and extension, which is  the largest among all specifications and functional classifications. 
Department-specific effects remain unchanged with respect to 2007 contemporaneous effects. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
vulnerability and spending. The effect on VAM 2003 is found to be a statistically significant and positive factor of 
future agricultural spending. In other words, past vulnerability seems to affect agricultural spending  allocations. 
Further work is needed to properly account for this potentially endogenous relationship. The preferred option, an 
instrumental variable approach, faces a number of difficulties, however. Finding good instruments is challenging, 
more so in this case, where many variables— including weather and geographic variables—– are already used to 
update the independent variable, VAM. Furthermore, political outcomes and managerial capacity of a municipality 
are arguably not exogenous to either spending decisions or vulnerability to food insecurity issues.  Interestingly, 
Faguet  (2004)  analysis  of  determinants  of  agricultural  spending  finds  that  neither  municipal  capacity  nor 
institutional features (in particular, the supervisory extent of civil society) are significant factors.  
11 We control for civil servant ―density‖ as well as other variables capturing institutional public capacity in the 
robustness check section. We cannot, however, control for income effects associated with salaries and other current 






Table 4. Effects of Past Per Capita Agricultural Spending (2006) on Vulnerability to Food 
Insecurity (2007) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Total exp  Restricted  and 
extended 
definitions 




         
Total expenditure  1.3166***          
  (0.333)       
Restricted expenditure     2.3526***       
    (0.569)     
Extended expenditure     0.9140**       
    (0.396)     
Current expenditures        2.0138**    
      (0.938)   
Investment expenditures        1.2630***    
      (0.353)   
Research and extension           13.2846*** 
        (4.328) 
Infrastructure           1.2186*** 
        (0.364) 
Support and development           -1.1690 
        (1.804) 
Administration and procedures           1.8195 
        (1.406) 
Chuquisaca  0.3188***  0.3154***  0.3133**  0.3379*** 
  (0.121)  (0.122)  (0.123)  (0.121) 
Cochabamba  0.0950  0.0878  0.0948  0.1025 
  (0.092)  (0.092)  (0.091)  (0.090) 
Oruro  0.1452  0.1214  0.1404  0.1290 
  (0.100)  (0.101)  (0.100)  (0.101) 
Potosí  0.3194***  0.3205***  0.3184***  0.3235*** 
  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.096)  (0.096) 
Tarija  -0.3482***  -0.3620***  -0.3537***  -0.3482*** 
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.031)  (0.033) 
Santa Cruz  -0.2887***  -0.2889***  -0.2889***  -0.2826*** 
  (0.059)  (0.059)  (0.060)  (0.057) 
Beni  -0.3143***  -0.3215***  -0.3197***  -0.3148*** 
  (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.046) 
Pando  -0.3957***  -0.3936***  -0.3985***  -0.3813***  
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  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.033)  (0.035) 
              
Observations  327  327  327  327 
Pseudo R2  0.241  0.254  0.242  0.256 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
 
 
Testing  how 2003  expenditures  affect  vulnerability in  2007  (Table 5) show that agricultural 
spending in 2003 has a statistically significant and positive association with 2007 VAM levels 
(Column 1). Results also confirm a larger association of restricted vis-à-vis extended spending, 
both statistically significant and, as found earlier, with the former roughly double in magnitude 
of the latter. Current spending in 2003 does not appear to have a significant relationship on the 
vulnerability in 2007, while investment spending continues to have a positive and statistically 
significant association. With a four-year spending lag, research and extension has a significant 
but negative effect on vulnerability. The link between research and extension and the reduction 
of  vulnerability  to  food  insecurity  is  stronger  when  a  longer  lag  of  spending  is  considered. 





Table 5. Effects of 2003 Per Capita Agricultural Spending on 2007 Vulnerability to Food 
Insecurity 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 







         
Total expenditure  0.9888***          
  (0.338)       
Restricted expenditure     1.2450**       
    (0.562)     
Extended expenditure     0.6782**       
    (0.313)     
Current expenditures        -0.0250    
      (0.564)   
Investment expenditures        1.3207***    
      (0.491)   
Research and extension           -11.1869** 
        (4.844) 
Infrastructure           1.3973*** 
        (0.531) 
Support and development           1.8166  
19 
 
        (1.723) 
Administration and procedures           -0.9973 
        (1.365) 
Chuquisaca  0.3503***  0.3273***  0.3411***  0.3331*** 
  (0.115)  (0.117)  (0.117)  (0.121) 
Cochabamba  0.1067  0.1136  0.1066  0.1141 
  (0.093)  (0.092)  (0.094)  (0.094) 
Oruro  0.1036  0.1256  0.1224  0.1206 
  (0.102)  (0.103)  (0.103)  (0.103) 
Potosí  0.3239***  0.3096***  0.3300***  0.3192*** 
  (0.095)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.095) 
Tarija  -0.2877***  -0.3020***  -0.2832***  -0.2883*** 
  (0.086)  (0.074)  (0.090)  (0.088) 
Santa Cruz  -0.2919***  -0.2965***  -0.2893***  -0.2816*** 
  (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.064) 
Beni  -0.3139***  -0.3130***  -0.3063***  -0.3046*** 
  (0.068)  (0.063)  (0.072)  (0.072) 
Pando  -0.3353***  -0.3765***  -0.3251***  -0.3303*** 
  (0.064)  (0.034)  (0.074)  (0.071) 
              
Observations  327  327  327  327 
Pseudo R2  0.223  0.218  0.227  0.235 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
 
 
Differential estimation  
We further explore the inter-temporal effects of agricultural spending on VAM by controlling for 
an initial level of spending, A0 (2003 level), and estimating the effect that the inter-temporal 
change in spending, ΔA (the increase between 2006 and 2007), has on the observed risk of 2007 
food insecurity. We call that change ‗incremental spending‖. Hence, estimates in this section 
inform about the association between such spending increases and vulnerability changes over 
time. Equation (2‘‘‘) introduces the new probit specification to be modeled:  




ji i t t j A A F V P ) ( )] 1 [( 1 , 0      (2‘‘‘) 
 
The dependent variable takes the value of 1 when the municipality moved into or remained at a 
high or very high vulnerability status (that is, VAM = 4 or 5) between 2006 and 2007.  
 
Results show that 2003 spending still has a positive association with future levels of high or very 
high vulnerability (Table 6). It also shows that increases in agricultural spending between 2006 
and 2007 are associated with reductions in vulnerability (Column 1). However, even though that 
association is statistically significant, it is negligible in size. This conclusion is robust to a non- 
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linear quadratic specification of incremental spending (Column 2). This finding suggests that 
agricultural spending alone, although sensitive to high levels of vulnerability, does not have a 
substantial  effect  in  the  short  run.  Department-specific  results  remain  very  similar  to  those 
reported in previous specifications.   
 
Table 6 shows an interesting pattern of incremental effects. Evidence in Columns 2 to 5 show 
that the past levels of investment spending, in particular on infrastructure, have positive and 
significant relationship with high VAMs.  Column 5 also shows that the effect of research and 
extension spending are statistically significant and working to reduce high VAMs (confirming 
the results in Table 5). Therefore, not only different categories of spending may have different 






Table 6. Effects of Initial and Incremental Per Capita Spending on Vulnerability 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
VARIABLES  Total exp  Total  exp 
(quadratic 










           
Total expenditure 2003   0.9950***  0.9659***          
  (0.344)  (0.338)       
Restricted expenditure 2003        0.9361*       
      (0.533)     
Extended expenditure 2003        1.0241**       
      (0.465)     
Current expenditures 2003            0.0598    
        (0.562)   
Investment expenditures 2003            1.2893***    
        (0.494)   
Research and extension 2003              -10.5311* 
          (6.056) 
Infrastructure 2003               1.3837** 
          (0.544) 
Support and development 2003              1.7249 
          (1.746) 
                                                           
12 Two alternative specifications not reported here are considered, one that takes spending levels in 2003 as initial, 
i.e., A0, and increases between 2003 and 2007 as incremental spending, that is, ΔA; and, alternatively, levels in 2006 
as A0 and incremental spending between 2006 and 2007 as ΔA. Estimates from both specifications confirm previous 
results. Past levels of spending have an effect on 2007 vulnerability, but the incremental spending does not. When 
considering 2006 levels and 2006-07 increment in spending, other spending categories again play a disproportionate 
role, which disappears when we consider 2003 and 2003-07 increments in spending. In that case, infrastructure 
investments again play the key role, again suggesting that their allocation is sensitive to high vulnerability levels.    
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Administration and procedures 2003               -0.8587 
          (1.351) 
Change  in  per  capita  agricultural 
spending 06-07 (“incremental “ effect) 
-0.0001**  0.0001  -0.0001**  -0.0001*  -0.0001** 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
                 
Change  squared  in  per  capita 
agricultural  spending  06-07 
(“incremental” effect) 
  -0.0000       
(0.000) 
                 
Chuquisaca  0.3492***  0.3479***  0.3507***  0.3411***  0.3322*** 
   (0.117)  (0.118)  (0.114)  (0.119)  (0.122) 
Cochabamba  0.1234  0.1135  0.1235  0.1231  0.1304 
   (0.095)  (0.094)  (0.095)  (0.095)  (0.096) 
Oruro  0.1238  0.1136  0.1245  0.1383  0.1262 
   (0.104)  (0.103)  (0.104)  (0.104)  (0.104) 
Potosí  0.3438***  0.3485***  0.3444***  0.3485***  0.3385*** 
   (0.097)  (0.099)  (0.097)  (0.096)  (0.097) 
Tarija  -0.2784***  -0.2794***  -0.2779***  -0.2739***  -0.2799*** 
   (0.090)  (0.078)  (0.090)  (0.094)  (0.094) 
Santa Cruz  -0.2895***  -0.2823***  -0.2892***  -0.2874***  -0.2803*** 
   (0.062)  (0.061)  (0.063)  (0.063)  (0.064) 
Beni  -0.3124***  -0.3003***  -0.3125***  -0.3053***  -0.3038*** 
   (0.067)  (0.063)  (0.067)  (0.070)  (0.071) 
Pando  -0.3320***  -0.3197***  -0.3313***  -0.3237***  -0.3298*** 
   (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.065)  (0.072)  (0.070) 
           
Observations  322  322  322  322  322 
R2  0.236  0.239  0.236  0.239  0.245 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1                
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
 
 
Annex 5 conducts robustness checks by including additional political and managerial controls of 
the municipality and further investigating the association of agricultural spending with specific 
improvements  of  vulnerability  (as  well  as  specific  cases  of  vulnerability  deterioration).  Key 





6.  Conclusions  
 
This paper explores the reduction of food insecurity in Bolivia, adopting a supply side approach 
that analyzes the role of agricultural spending on vulnerability. Previous findings on the role of  
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public spending on welfare in Bolivia paint a picture of increasing allocation of resources based 
on needs without a strong effect in improving welfare. However, no study before had specifically 
analyzed food security and agricultural spending. Our results confirm that picture but also add 
some insights on the role that spending may have on reducing vulnerability. In addition, from a 
policy perspective, our analysis provides a number of relevant findings related to spending (and 
investment) decisions in a global context of increasing risks as food prices start to rise again.  
 
First,  vulnerability  to  food  insecurity  across  municipalities,  as  measured  by  VAM,  has  on 
average been on the decrease between 2003 and 2007. However, this improvement has not been 
uniform,  with  only  four  departments  exhibiting  a  moderate  to  low  or  very  low  risk  of 
vulnerability (Tarija and the llanos departments).  
 
Second, a simple correlation exercise suggests that increases in public spending in agriculture—
both  in  absolute  and  per  capita  terms—are  weakly  associated  with  both  decreases  in  high 
vulnerability  and  increases  in  low  vulnerability  to  food  insecurity.  Both  correlations  do  not 
appear to be strong, partly because of potentially offsetting compositional effects of spending 
and partly because agricultural spending alone may not be an adequate tool for significantly 
impacting vulnerability. 
 
Third, our econometric results indicate that levels of public agricultural spending are positively 
associated with high or very high vulnerability. We interpret this to indicate that agricultural 
spending allocation decisions are driven by high or very high vulnerability levels. In other words, 
more  agricultural  spending  appears  to  be  destined  to  where  it  is  more  needed  in  line  with 
previous  findings  in  the  literature  for  other  sectors.  This  is  confirmed  through  a  number  of 
specifications,  including  contemporaneous  and  lagged  relationships  between  spending  and 
vulnerability.  This  is  particularly  the  case  for  restricted  expenditures  (those  just  on  core 
agricultural  spending,  rather  than  rural  development  more  generally),  as  well  as  for  capital 
investments making a difference in terms of infrastructural improvements. This indicates the 
importance of the composition of public agricultural spending in shaping its relationship with 
vulnerability to food insecurity.  
 
Fourth, there is evidence of important temporal effects of spending on the vulnerability to food 
insecurity.  When  considering  levels,  a  one-year  lag  of  spending  appears  to  have  a  larger 
association on vulnerability as compared to a four-year lag. When considering the incremental 
effects of 2006-2007 spending, however, it is evident that the change in the levels of spending 
does not appear to be effectively  associated with high vulnerability nor substantially deliver 
improvements in vulnerability status.  
 
Fifth, there are department-specific effects, which may point to a more ‗regional‘ pattern of 
impacts  of  spending  on  municipal  vulnerability.  The  valley  departments  of  Chuquisaca  and 
Cochabamba appear to be more likely to observe high or very high levels of vulnerability than 
the rest. For the altiplano Andean departments of La Paz, Potosi and Oruro, we find no specific 
effects once we control for spending. For the llanos departments of Beni, Santa Cruz and Pando 
and the valley department of Tarija, we find specific effects pointing towards lower vulnerability 




There  are  two  main  areas  for  further  research  that  emerge  from  this  analysis.  First,  the 
endogenous  relationship  between  spending  and  vulnerability  needs  further  scrutiny. 
Unfortunately, the very construction of VAM and its updating leaves very little room for the 
selection of strong instruments. Potential candidates such as weather shocks, political economy 
or managerial capacity of municipalities are already used in the construction of VAM or are 
proven bad candidates. A final consideration is the inclusion of relevant public spending in the 
analysis. Agricultural spending used in our analysis includes a variety of programs and projects 
that  are  not  necessarily  conceived  to  reduce  food  insecurity.  Likewise,  as  indicated  in  the 
introduction, the Government of Bolivia considers other programs—such as cash and in-kind 
transfers—to be part of its strategy to reduce vulnerability. Future work will address the need to 
construct a precise classification of food insecurity related public spending. 
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Annex 1: Current List of Programs and Projects that Support Food Security Strategy 
 
1. National Plan for Land Titling  
This program is intended to provide legal security in land tenure to all sectors. 
2. National Plan for Land Distribution and Human Settlements  
The strategy is aimed both at reducing pressure on land resources and natural resources in general, caused 
by  the  intensive  use  and  misuse  of  land,  and  to  incorporate  standards  and  practices  of  sustainable 
management of natural resources. To this end, it shall promote the integrated sustainable development 
into new communities, and lands based on the sustainable management of natural resources and economic 
activities to ensure the family income. 
3. Planting the Right for Food (SEMBRAR) 
SEMBRAR promotes the human right to adequate food from the local level, through the development of 
information processing, communication and training, and coordinate partnerships between public, private 
and civil society to establish institutions and mechanisms for the promotion local production of food. 
4. Creation of Rural Food Initiatives (CRIAR)  
The initiative is to strengthen peasant family agriculture on the basis of a community, and support food 
production for local markets  
5. Organized Enterprises for Development (EMPODERAR)  
EMPODERAR supports the development of productive initiatives in agriculture and strengthens local 
institutional capacity to boost rural productive development, including agro-forestry and non-agricultural 
rural producers through non-reimbursable transfers, with partnerships with local counterpart financing. 
The  Rural  Alliances  Project  (PAR)  financed  by  the  World  Bank  is  an  important  component  of  this 
program. Another one is the Local Agricultural Economic Development Project (DELA) financed by 
Denmark.  
6. Renewal of the Role of the State in Rural Food Businesses (RECREAR)  
This program supports farmers in basic food production and wholesale marketing, as well as promotes 
processing of renewable natural products to ensure strategic access to its benefits for local people and the 
country's development 
7. Development of territorial, integration and cross-sectoral production complexes  
This strategy will develop the municipal land use planning to establish the productive potential and land 
suitability  for  different  human  activities  (industrial,  tourism,  mining,  energy)  and  its  extensions  of 
agriculture and forestry, agroforestry, apiculture, and flowers. 
8. National Plan for Coca Development  
The plan proposes that the state set the conditions for industrialization and commercialization of coca leaf 
for domestic and foreign markets and promote awareness of alternative uses internationally, as well as the 
development of the producing areas. 
9. Sustainable Use of Natural Resources (SUSTENTAR)  
SUSTENTAR  encourages  value-added  production  and  trade  of  goods  and  services  derived  from 
biodiversity,  creating  fair  and  equitable  benefits  to  local  people,  under  the  criteria  of  ecological 
sustainability, social and economic and organizational support mechanisms, financial and technical, to 
promote  the  generation  of  productive  capacities  of  indigenous  peoples,  peasant  communities  and 
traditional users of the forest, harvesting, processing and marketing of forest products. 
10. Conservation of Nature and Environmental Quality (CONSERVAR) 
CONSERVAR is designed to create a better understanding and awareness of potential climate change 
effects,  as  well  as  building  capacity  to  develop  adaptation  measures  based  on  new  information  and 
traditional knowledge. 
11. Food Security Support Program (PASA)  
PASA enhances the availability, access to and use of food by the poorest sectors of society by financing 
investment projects. The program operates in all nine departments of Bolivia. PASA I (1997-2008) has 
implemented 342 projects and PASA II (2005-2010) – 109 projects. It became a de-concentrated entity in 
2007 and has a national mandate for food security. The investment is done through transfers – 85 percent  
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of  the  project  amount  with  the  remaining  15  percent  being  local  counterpart.  The  average  budget 
execution for PASA during the period 2006-2009 is 49 percent.  
12. Multisectoral Program of Zero Malnutrition  
The goal of the program is to eradicate malnutrition in children under two years of age. The program has 
been implemented in two phases. The first phase includes 52 municipalities; the second phase includes 
114 municipalities. Municipalities are prioritized according to the  Vulnerability  Index Map for Food 
Security (VAM 4 and 5). 
13. School Breakfast and Lunch Program 
The program ensures the provision of nutritious food to school children and provides workshops for 
community awareness about the importance of feeding the population segments in order to reduce levels 
of malnutrition and improving school performance. 
 
Source: Adapted from MVI Social (2010). 
   




Annex 2: Definitions 
 
Area  Category  Type  Current/Investment 
Expenditure 
Research, studies  Research & Extension  Restricted  Current 
Technical assistance, seminars  Research & Extension  Restricted  Current 
Water and irrigation  Infrastructure  Restricted  Investment 
Support  Support & Development  Restricted  Current 
Assets and machinery   Infrastructure  Restricted  Investment 
Seeds, fertilizer  Infrastructure  Restricted  Current 
Infrastructure  Infrastructure  Restricted  Investment 
Health support  Support & Development  Restricted  Current 
Administration, regulation  Administration & Procedures  Restricted  Current 
Development   Support & Development  Restricted  Current 
Support  Support & Development  Restricted  Current 
Roads and bridges  Infrastructure  Extended  Investment 
Electricity infrastructure  Infrastructure  Extended  Investment 
Warehousing and commercialization  Support & Development  Extended  Current 
Risk management  Administration & Procedures  Extended  Current 
Environmental management   Administration & Procedures  Extended  Current 
Land organization  Administration & Procedures  Extended  Current 
Organizational support  Administration & Procedures  Extended  Current 
Education  Research & Extension  Extended  Current 
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Annex 3: Effect of Past VAM on Current Agricultural Spending 
 
Per Capita Agricultural Spending in 2007 and 2003 VAM 
   (1) 
VARIABLES  Total Exp 
     
vam2003  0.0760*** 
  (0.025) 
Chuquisaca  0.0997*** 
  (0.028) 
Cochabamba  0.0758** 
  (0.030) 
Oruro  0.0410** 
  (0.020) 
Potosi  0.0066 
  (0.018) 
Tarija  0.6483*** 
  (0.157) 
Santa Cruz  0.0237 
  (0.021) 
Beni  0.0962*** 
  (0.036) 
Pando  0.6225*** 
  (0.149) 
Constant  0.0518*** 
  (0.019) 
   
Observations  327 
R-squared  0.447 
Pseudo R2  . 
Robust standard errors in parentheses   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
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Where  Aj  and  Dj  refer  to  per  capita  spending  by  municipality,  D  are  dummy  variables  capturing 





    
29 
 
Annex 4: Ordered Probit 
 
Ordered Probit VAM 2007         
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  vam_2007  vam_2007  vam_2007  vam_2007 
              
Total Expenditure  0.2233       
  (0.180)       
Restricted expenditure    0.1471     
    (0.514)     
Extended expenditure    0.2726     
    (0.277)     
Operational Expenditure      -1.0325*   
      (0.558)   
Investment Expenditure      0.5923*   
      (0.335)   
Research and Education        -8.9508 
        (8.244) 
Infrastructure        0.5755* 
        (0.331) 
Support and Development        -1.6714* 
        (0.990) 
Administration and procedures        -0.9669 
        (1.002) 
cut1  -2.0575***  -2.0577***  -2.0889***  -2.1098*** 
  (0.170)  (0.171)  (0.173)  (0.177) 
cut2  -0.7334***  -0.7334***  -0.7541***  -0.7647*** 
  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.087)  (0.087) 
cut3  0.3402***  0.3403***  0.3299***  0.3239*** 
  (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.079)  (0.078) 
cut4  1.6105***  1.6104***  1.6092***  1.6047*** 
  (0.118)  (0.118)  (0.117)  (0.117) 
         
Constant         
         
Observations  327  327  327  327 
              
Robust standard errors in parentheses         
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1         













Annex 5: Robustness Checks 
 
Differential  estimation   
 
We also explore the symmetry of the effects of incremental spending on vulnerability. Table A1 
reports the results of past spending (in 2003) and marginal increases (2006-07) in the probability 
of meaningful decreases in vulnerability. By ‗meaningful‘ we consider changes in vulnerability 
categories that move a municipality from high or very high levels of risk in 2003 into moderate 
or low/very low levels of vulnerability in 2007. In other words, we include all improvements in 
vulnerability status except for those changes that simply move the municipality from very high to 
high levels of vulnerability.   
 
Results change substantively with respect to the probability of moving into or staying at high or 
very high levels of vulnerability reported in Table 6. Now, neither past nor incremental spending 
has statistically significant associations (Column 1), nor does even restricted spending seem to 
have an association on vulnerability reduction. Investment spending has no longer statistically 
significant effect,
13 and no single other category of spending is found to be significant either.  
 
Department-specific  results  also  change  in  terms  of  significance  and  signs.  There  is  no 
department better positioned (controlling for spending) to reduce its vulnerability vis -à-vis La 
Paz, and three—Chuquisaca, Cochabamba and Santa Cruz—appear to be less likely to reduce 
their vulnerability to food insecurity than La Paz. This is certainly an odd group, as it includes 
the department with the highest vulnerability to start with, Chuquisaca, and one with one of the 
lowest  vulnerabilities, Santa Cruz. These results  are consistent  with  the scarce or negligible 
effect of spending on vulnerability found before: increases in the short run do not appear to be 
effectively  associated  with  reductions  in  high  vulnerability  nor  with  improvements  in 
vulnerability status.  
 
Table  A1.  Effects  of  Past  and  Incremental  Per  Capita  Spending  on  Improvements  in 
Vulnerability Status  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VARIABLES  Total exp  Restricted 
and  extended 
definitions 




         
Total expenditure 2003  -0.0947          
  (0.115)       
Restricted expenditure 2003     0.0598       
    (0.204)     
Extended expenditure 2003     -0.2253       
    (0.220)     
Current expenditures 2003        -0.2083    
                                                           
13 These results are also consistent with those presented in Annex 4 on the effect of spending on vulnerability along 
the entire distribution of risk, that is, from very low to very high categories. The asymmetric effect of spending at 
different sections of the distribution substantiates an insignificant combined effect.   
31 
 
      (0.251)   
Investment expenditures 2003        -0.0591    
      (0.121)   
Research and Extension 2003           6.9071** 
        (3.144) 
Infrastructure 2003           -0.1012 
        (0.122) 
Support and development 2003           0.1489 
        (1.084) 
Administration and procedures 2003         -0.8850 
        (0.986) 
Change  in  per  capita  agricultural  spending 
06-07 (“incremental” effect) 
0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Chuquisaca  -0.0595*  -0.0606*  -0.0605*  -0.0612** 
  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.027) 
Cochabamba  -0.0919***  -0.0915***  -0.0919***  -0.0900*** 
  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.025) 
Oruro  -0.0377  -0.0386  -0.0370  -0.0322 
  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.037) 
Potosí  -0.0491  -0.0503  -0.0488  -0.0436 
  (0.033)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.032) 
Tarija  -0.0047  -0.0052  -0.0040  -0.0207 
  (0.072)  (0.071)  (0.072)  (0.056) 
Santa Cruz  -0.1183***  -0.1181***  -0.1181***  -0.1179*** 
  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.024) 
Pando  0.0168  0.0067  0.0217  0.0443 
  (0.073)  (0.068)  (0.078)  (0.085) 
              
Observations  303  303  303  303 
R2  0.0913  0.0940  0.0918  0.116 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 




This section reports the estimates from alternative specifications of Equation 2 that address two 
potentially important issues: scale effects and the inclusion of observable controls in the areas of 
municipal  capacity  and  political  issues.  In  all  previous  estimations,  agricultural  spending 
variables are expressed  in  per capita terms,  in  order to  get  rid of scale effects—that is,  the 
possibility of vulnerability impacts are being driven mainly by the magnitude of spending rather 
than its efficiency. Estimations were also undertaken using total spending, thus capturing the  
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effect of the actual total spending rather than per capita spending. Population of the municipality 
is included, as a separate control.  
 
The results by and large confirm those obtained in per capita terms (Table A2). Increasing total 
expenditure  in  agriculture  remains  associated  with  a  higher  vulnerability  to  food  insecurity; 
restricted spending has a significant positive relationship with vulnerability; and investment has a 
significant  positive  link with  vulnerability, but  unsubstantial  in magnitude. These results  are 
observed for 2003 (Columns 1 to 3) but not for 2007, where the associations of all categories of 
spending are statistically insignificant (Columns 4 to 6). The finding of distinctive long- and 
short-term  effects  (reported  above  in  Table  6)  is  also  confirmed  for  total  spending  as  well 
(Columns 7 to 9). Past total spending is associated with higher vulnerability to food insecurity, 
but the 2006-2007 incremental change reduces vulnerability, although again negligibly. Evidence 
also suggests different patterns of long- and short-term effects by type of spending. Investment 
spending has the only significant incremental effect in addition to the significant effect of past 
total spending, which is again negligible in magnitude (Column 9).  
 
Table A2. Effects of Total Agricultural Spending    
Dependent Variable  High VAM in 2003   High VAM in 2007  Increasing VAM from 06-07 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
VARIABLES                   
                             
Total expenditure  0.0001***      0.0000      0.0000*     
   (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)       
Restricted 
expenditure 
  0.0002**      0.0000      0.0000   
      (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)    
Extended 
expenditure 
  0.0000      0.0000      0.0000   
      (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000)    
Current expenditure      -0.0000      -0.0001      -0.0001 
         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000) 
Investment 
expenditure 
    0.0001***      0.0000      0.0000** 
         (0.000)        (0.000)        (0.000) 
Change  in  total  per 
capita  agricultural 
spending  06-07 
(“incremental” 
effect) 
            -0.0001**    -0.0001** 
                     (0.000)    (0.000) 
Change in restricted 
per  capita 
agricultural 
spending  06-07 
(“incremental” 
effect) 
              -0.0001   
                        (0.000)    
Change  in  extended 
per  capita 
agricultural 
spending  06-07 
(“incremental” 
effect) 
              0.0000    
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                        (0.000)    
Regional dummies  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Population  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  327  327  327  327  327  327  322  309  322 
R2  0.301  0.304  0.303  0.265  0.271  0.266  0.292  0.305  0.297 
***  p<0.01,  ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1 
                          
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
 
Finally, as acknowledged in the construction of the VAM, there are a number of additional 
controls that might affect the vulnerability of a municipality to food insecurity in Bolivia. We 
can conceptualize those factors in broad economic terms as demand and supply factors. Demand 
factors refer to individual, household and municipal characteristics that increase the demand for 
food,  such  as  socioeconomic  status  of  households,  individual  preferences,  household 
composition  and  municipality  demographics.  Supply  factors  that  may  affect  the  capacity  to 
provide food to satisfy its demand include agricultural production and productivity, available 
arable  land,  infrastructure  (roads  in  particular),  social  transfers,  climatic  and  demographic 
conditions,  municipal  capacity  and  governance  and  political  economy  considerations.  An 
expanded single equation model for food insecurity vulnerability can capture those factors, Zjk, as 
presented in the probit specification 3: 
 




ji i j Z A F V P ) ( ) 1 (        (3) 
 
However, a host of these potential factors are already used to annually update the probability of 
pertaining  to  each  VAM  category,  such  as  urbanization  rate,  density  of  rural  population, 
institutionally assisted births, schooling years, total per capita consumption, malnutrition rate, 
altitude, rainfall and a flood dummy. This limits the selection of possible controls in our analysis, 
as we cannot include variables used already to estimate the dependent variable. As a result, we 
focus on a variable capturing the capacity of the municipality Cj, proxied by three alternatives: 
percentage of own resources used to finance investment expenditure budgets; the number of civil 
servants by municipality (in per capita terms); or the percent of executed vis-à-vis approved 
budgets. We also include a political economy variable, Pj, which captures whether the political 
party in office at the municipal level is the same as the party in office at the national level 
(MAS); and Sj., which captures per capita social spending (in health and education) accruing to 
each  municipality.  All  these  controls  refer  to  2006,  in  an  attempt  to  avoid  a  potential 
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Table A3. Effects of Per Capita Agricultural Spending with Observed Controls, 2007 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Total expenditure  0.5399**  0.5776***  0.6113*  0.3190*  0.5842***  0.5839*       
  (0.217)  (0.221)  (0.328)  (0.178)  (0.221)  (0.325)      
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Restricted expenditure                    1.7848**    
              (0.778)   
Extended expenditure                    -0.0856    
              (0.522)   
Current expenditure                       0.8600 
                (0.964) 
Investment expenditure                       0.5380 
                (0.408) 
Civil servants pc, 2006  2.0963          0.1927  -0.8149  0.6524 
  (11.532)          (23.856)  (22.781)  (23.946) 
Political party in office, 
2006 
  0.0683        0.0782  0.0937  0.0792 
    (0.063)        (0.078)  (0.080)  (0.078) 
%  budget  executed 
over approved (2006) 
    -0.0003*      -0.0003*  -0.0003*  -0.0003* 
      (0.000)      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
%  of  investment 
financed  by  own 
resources (2006) 
      -0.0000***         
        (0.000)         
Per  capita  social 
spending, 2006 
        -0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0002 
          (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Regional dummies  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Population  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Observations  300  327  234  314  327  227  227  227 
R2  0.214  0.22  0.237  0.27  0.217  0.225  0.235  0.225 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1          
Note: Marginal effects reported; standard errors reported in parenthesis. 
Source: Authors from World Bank (2010) APER database.  
 
Results  suggest  that  neither  political  party  in  office  nor  density  of  civil  servants  have  a 
significant association with vulnerability, after controlling for agricultural spending (Table A3). 
Although both social spending and the extent of budget execution at the municipal level are 
associated  with  reductions  in  the  probability  of  high  vulnerability,  their  magnitude  is  rather 
small. Interestingly, in all cases, per capita total agricultural spending maintains a positive and 
statistically significant relationship with high vulnerability, with restricted categories of spending 
being more dominant  than extended categories.  Investment  spending is  not  found to  have  a 
statistically significant relationship with high vulnerability.  
 
 